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Abstract Prior research investigates the role of start-up
costs and taxes with regard to entrepreneurship. Yet,
little distinction is made regarding the type of entrepre-
neurship, particularly innovative versus non-innovative
entrepreneurship. We shall argue that start-up costs and
taxes are associated in different ways with innovative
versus non-innovative entrepreneurship. Taxes being
recurring costs should mainly relate to innovative entre-
preneurship, whereas start-up costs being one-off costs
should mainly relate to non-innovative entrepreneur-
ship. Analyzing a dataset of 632,116 individuals, includ-
ing 43,223 entrepreneurs from 53 countries, we can
partially confirm our predictions. Corporate taxes show
a negative relationship with innovative entrepreneur-
ship, whereas income taxes seem to have no
relationship. High start-up costs have a positive relation-
ship with innovative entrepreneurship, although this
finding only holds true in cross-sectional investigations.
Our paper contributes to the discussion on how govern-
mental regulation and taxes relate to entrepreneurship.
Keywords Innovative entrepreneurship . Corporate
taxes . Personal income taxes . Start-up costs . GEM
JEL codes L26 . H24 . D24
1 Introduction
A large prior literature has investigated how government
regulations, policies, and actions relate to entrepre-
neurship (see Blackburn and Schaper (2016), for a
summary). Within this literature, many studies have
investigated the role of taxes and start-up costs
(Gentry and Hubbard 2000; Djankov et al. 2002;
Klapper et al. 2006; Cullen and Gordon 2007;
Braunerhjelm and Eklund 2014; Block 2016). Both
taxes and start-up costs can be directly influenced by
government policy and are shown to have strong
relationships with entrepreneurship rates. So far, no
study has investigated the role of taxes and start-up
costs with regard to innovative entrepreneurship. This
is an important oversight, as we believe that the dis-
tinction between innovative and non-innovative en-
trepreneurship is an important one. While many
policy-makers and scholars use the terms innovation
and entrepreneurship interchangeably (Dreher and
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Gassebner 2013; Autio et al. 2014) and even try to
stimulate one in the hope of getting more of the other,
only very few entrepreneurs innovate (Reynolds et al.
2005; Block et al. 2017). Yet, prior research shows
that, in particular, such innovative entrepreneurs are
responsible for economic growth and development
(Autio et al. 2014; Block et al. 2017).
We shall argue that start-up costs and taxes are asso-
ciated in different ways with innovative entrepreneurship.
Start-up costs such as notary charges or registration costs
are one-off costs that increase the barriers of entry into
entrepreneurship. High start-up costs are usually associ-
ated with low entrepreneurship rates. Yet, high start-up
costs may not only influence the quantity of entrepreneur-
ship but also the quality and type of entrepreneurship. In
fact, high start-up costs may lead to a positive selection of
those individuals who are highly motivated and expect
high incomes from entrepreneurship. Monteiro and
Assunção (2012), Branstetter et al. (2014), and Rostam-
Afschar (2014) find that low start-up regulations attract
low quality entrepreneurs with low expected returns. We
argue that innovative entrepreneurs expecting high
returns (Schumpeter 1934) are more willing, compared
to other entrepreneurs, to incur high start-up costs. In
addition, they are usually well positioned to attract exter-
nal funding (Desai et al. 2003). Taxes, in turn, represent
recurring costs reducing the gains from innovation and
entrepreneurial profit. They have a deterrent and discour-
aging effect particularly for risk-taking entrepreneurs
with innovative ideas (Hansson 2012). Taxes reduce the
expected return on innovation and, thus, discourage in-
novative entrepreneurship. High tax rates partially re-
move the Bprize^ of introducing a new product to the
market, while entrepreneurs remain responsible and liable
when their ideas fail (Gentry and Hubbard 2000; Cullen
and Gordon 2007). In our investigations, we distinguish
between income and corporate taxes and how they are
associated with innovative entrepreneurship. While in-
come taxes concern the income from unincorporated
firms, corporate taxes refer to the income from incorpo-
rated firms (Cullen and Gordon 2007). Most innovative
entrepreneurs register their businesses as corporations in
order to grow faster and attract external funding. Thus,
there is reason to believe that corporate taxes should have
a stronger relationship with innovative entrepreneurship
than income taxes have.
To investigate how start-up costs and taxes relate to
innovative entrepreneurship, we use the Global Entre-
preneurshipMonitor (GEM) dataset, which is composed
of 632,116 individuals, including 43,223 entrepreneurs
from 53 countries from 2004 to 2011. Conducting both
cross-sectional and longitudinal regressions, we can
partially confirm our predictions. Corporate taxes show
a negative relationship with innovative entrepreneur-
ship, whereas income taxes seem to show no relation-
ship. High start-up costs seem to have a positive rela-
tionship with innovative entrepreneurship, although this
finding seems to only hold true in cross-sectional and
not in longitudinal investigations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next
section develops hypotheses on how start-up costs and
taxes relate to innovative entrepreneurship. Then, we
describe our data sources, variables, and methods. Sub-
sequently, we present our main results, together with a
number of robustness checks. In the final section, we
present the main conclusions, implications, and limita-
tions of the study.
2 Theory and hypotheses
2.1 Start-up costs and innovative entrepreneurship
Start-up regulations are procedures and requirements
imposed by governments for starting a business. Start-
up regulations are established to ensure that new com-
panies meet minimum requirements to provide goods or
services to the market (SRI International 1999). Several
studies, particularly those rooted in a neo-classical eco-
nomics perspective, suggest that minimal start-up regu-
lations encourage entrepreneurship (Djankov et al.
2002; Klapper et al. 2006). Djankov et al. (2002) show
that countries with high start-up regulations have high
levels of corruption and low qualities of public or pri-
vate goods. A number of studies (e.g., Bruhn 2011;
Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2013) found that reforms
in entry regulations can increase competition and Total
Factor Productivity (TFP). Yet, there is also a positive
aspect of entry regulations. According to Scarpetta et al.
(2002), high entry and adjustment costs in Europe may
stimulate a pre-market selection of business plans with
less market experimentation. They also add that there is
no evidence in their data that one model (i.e., low entry
barriers) dominates the other (i.e., high entry barriers) in
terms of aggregate performance. A few studies (e.g.,
Branstetter et al. 2014; Rostam-Afschar 2014; Schulz
et al. 2016) focus on characteristics of new entrepre-
neurs and the quality of their ideas after reforms in entry
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regulations. In fact, the assumption that lowering start-
up costs leads to the entry of higher quality entrepre-
neurs has been challenged by these studies (Kaplan et al.
2011; Branstetter et al. 2014; Rostam-Afschar 2014).
Rostam-Afschar (2014) uses a sample of German indi-
viduals and finds that reducing entry regulations leads to
a higher number of untrained workers becoming entre-
preneurs. This is primarily because high entry barriers
deter such untrained workers from becoming entrepre-
neurs. Trained workers, with a higher level of human
capital, have sufficient means to become entrepreneurs,
even if the entry barriers are considerably high
(Davidsson and Honig 2003).
We argue that when start-up costs are high, it is in
particular those individuals with not so promising or
novel ideas who are deterred to become entrepreneurs.
Individuals with such ideas do not expect high returns,
and so are less willing to incur high one-off entry costs.
Reducing start-up costs makes it easier and more attrac-
tive for them to become entrepreneurs. In line with this,
Schulz et al. (2016) found that entry deregulation through
the introduction of the one-stop shop policy in Mexico
has led to the entry of disproportionally more part-time
than full-time entrepreneurs. Part-time entrepreneurs of-
ten do not have innovation as their main goal but rather
start their venture to earn a side income next to their main
job (Block and Landgraf 2016). It also often coincides
with a high-risk aversion which does not go well with
innovative entrepreneurship. Part-time entrepreneurs of-
ten do not have enough time, courage, and dedication to
build an innovative new product and properly test it in
the market (Raffiee and Feng 2014). We shall argue
that part-time entrepreneurs are among those entre-
preneurs who are particularly deterred by high start-
up costs. The situation is different for full-time entre-
preneurs with innovative business ideas, who may be
willing to bear high start-up costs because they expect
high returns from their ventures (Gregg and
Parthasarathy 2017). Entry costs are one-off costs
and are not directly linked to the rewards from their
innovative venture. In addition, individuals with in-
novative ideas usually are in a good position to attract
external financing such as debt financing from banks
or equity financing from venture capitalist or business
angels (Desai et al. 2003). Such funding allows them
to overcome high start-up costs and facilitates entre-
preneurial entry (Ho and Wong 2007). Finally, by
incurring high start-up costs innovative entrepreneurs
can signal to banks and other financing providers that
they believe in their ideas and the rewards that come
with them. This signaling theory argument applies
less to non-innovative entrepreneurs who typically
do not need external financing to pursue their venture.
Higher willingness to pay start-up costs signals higher
quality and may be interpreted as commitment of the
entrepreneur to the business opportunity (Suchman
1995), particularly from the perspective of resource
providers and other stakeholders. When a new firm
takes advantage of relaxed entry requirements, it may
fail to signal that it has the certifications, resources,
and accomplishments needed to succeed. Lower entry
requirements can particularly undermine the ability of
innovative entrepreneurs to gather resources (Hallen
and Eisenhardt 2012), and it might be more difficult to
obtain funding for innovative ideas (De Meza and
Webb 1999). Banks do not know the quality of the
entrepreneurs’ projects due to asymmetric informa-
tion and the high volume of entrepreneurs and may
assume because of inexpensive entry that there are
many low-ability entrepreneurs.
To summarize the previous arguments, we propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Start-up costs have a positive relation-
ship with innovative entrepreneurship.
2.2 Taxes and innovative entrepreneurship
Designing a tax structure is a complex task due to its
various effects on citizens, including business owners
(Balliamoune-Lutz and Garello 2014). Governments
face an important dilemma when making decisions
about tax rates. On the one hand, they need to collect
sufficient taxes to provide high-quality public goods and
services for their citizens. On the other hand, they want
to avoid the danger of deterring economic growth by
onerous taxation (Lee and Gordon 2005).
The tax system affects entrepreneurial decisions and
often taxes successful ventures at a disproportionally
higher rate than unsuccessful ones (Gentry and
Hubbard 2000). A recent study by Wen and Gordon
(2014) shows that tax progression influences the occu-
pational choice between self-employment and paid em-
ployment, so that with more progressivity, individuals
are less likely to opt for self-employment. This finding
indicates how career decisions of individuals can de-
pend on tax rates, so that with high tax rates (and with
more progressivity), the opportunity costs of entrepre-
neurship will increase. Although prior studies suggest
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that entrepreneurs have more opportunities to avoid
paying taxes than employees (Kamleitner et al. 2012),
they mentally perceive taxes as payments Bout of
pocket.^ Unlike employees who are rather passive in
receiving information about the amount of taxes they
pay, business owners think of taxes as a loss by looking
at their gross income as the outcome of their work. To
make matters worse, taxes are recurring costs taking
away part of the gross income periodically. People cog-
nitively separate various sources of costs and incomes
and constitute several mental accounts for such sources
(Thaler 1999). Since taxes are seen mainly by entrepre-
neurs to form part of the mental income account, pay-
ment of taxes is painful and perceived as reducing
income. In addition to tax evasion, taxes may influence
other strategic decisions of entrepreneurs such as their
willingness to introduce new ideas and new products.
There are two main types of taxes on entrepreneurs
depending on the legal type of their venture. In many
countries (e.g., the Netherlands and the USA), profits
are taxed under the corporate tax system when the
business is incorporated (e.g., limited liability corpora-
tions), while income taxes are imposed on individual
earnings. The latter concerns unincorporated firms (e.g.,
sole proprietorship) (Bruce and Mohsin 2006; Block
2016). We argue that both types of taxes have deterring
effects on innovative entrepreneurship.
2.2.1 Corporate taxes and innovative entrepreneurship
Corporate tax refers to the tax that corporations pay on
their taxable income. This tax is to be distinguished from
capital gains tax (i.e., to be paid on profits that an investor
receives when he or she sells a capital asset for a higher
price than the purchase price), personal income tax (to be
paid on earned income by the self-employed or wage
workers), and capital income tax (to be paid on dividend
or interest income) (Block 2016). We argue that since
corporate tax is a frequently recurring cost, it can have a
deterrent effect on innovative entrepreneurship. There are
a number of reasons why this deterrent effect may occur.
First, high corporate tax reduces the prize of innova-
tion because it usually increases with the venture’s prof-
it, sometimes even in a progressive manner. In fact, high
tax re-distributes wealth from successful innovative en-
trepreneurs to other citizens in society with low or no
income (e.g., the unemployed) (Gentry and Hubbard
2000; Baumol et al. 2007). Corporate tax can discourage
entrepreneurs from engaging in innovative yet risky
activities (Balliamoune-Lutz and Garello 2014;
Clingingsmith and Shane 2016). When a tax code taxes
profits more heavily than it provides tax credits for
losses of corresponding size, policy-makers create an
incentive to engage in activities that generate income
with lower variability. This incentive increases with the
size of the marginal tax rate. The formal entry of inno-
vative entrepreneurs largely depends on their expected
returns on innovation. Because corporate tax will repeat-
edly take away a portion of the income from innovation,
high tax levels are expected to discourage individuals
with innovative ideas from starting a business. In such
situations, individuals with innovative ideas may either
become intrapreneurs or just give up on their ideas due
to its low (monetary) rewards.
Second, high corporate tax rates can have an adverse
impact on the entrepreneurs’ ability to invest in innova-
tion. Prior research has found that one of the main
sources of investment capital for entrepreneurs, espe-
cially during the early stages of the venture, are retained
business earnings (Henrekson and Sanandaji 2011).
This is mainly due to the high agency costs of other
sources of investment capital. High corporate tax rates
take away part of the start-up’s income that could be
invested in innovation. Moreover, low corporate tax
rates create incentives for external investments in inno-
vative ventures. This is mainly because external inves-
tors can generate higher returns on their investments.
Such lower tax rates and tax breaks have attracted, for
example, angel investors in a number of American states
to invest in innovative start-ups (Chatterji et al. 2014).
To summarize, high levels of corporate taxation may
make it more difficult for entrepreneurs to finance their
innovative ideas.
Third, high tax rates may be associated with exten-
sive safety net programs, such as generous unemploy-
ment benefits and universal health insurance (Baumol
et al. 2007). A tax-financed welfare system may reduce
household savings and may limit entrepreneurial invest-
ments and capital accumulation (Fölster 2002), which
are important determinants of a country’s level of inno-
vative entrepreneurship (Schumpeter 1934; Baumol
et al. 2007). In addition, such safety net programs usu-
ally point to a culture that does not appreciate and
reward hardworking individuals (Baumol et al. 2007).
This could further lead to a lower tendency among
entrepreneurs to innovate, because innovation requires
much effort to arrange a Bnew combination of means of
production^ (Schumpeter 1934).
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Building on these three lines of arguments, we pro-
pose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Corporate taxes have a negative rela-
tionship with innovative entrepreneurship.
2.2.2 Income taxes and innovative entrepreneurship
Income tax concerns a different group of entrepreneurs
than corporate tax does. It applies to individual earnings
taken from unincorporated firms (Block 2016), which are
typically less growth oriented than other firms (Haans and
van Witteloostuijn 2016). An important difference be-
tween income and corporate tax is that in many countries
including the USA, losses from personal income are de-
ductible from other income under the personal tax code but
not under the corporate tax code (Cullen andGordon 2007;
Hansson 2012). Cullen andGordon (2007) found that a cut
in the personal tax rate would reduce entrepreneurial risk
taking. This is in fact a reason for the severe impact of high
corporate rates on the individuals’ decisions for incorpora-
tion while those under the income tax scheme may view
entrepreneurial risks differently. In fact, individuals are
more likely to undertake innovative high risk-high gain
activities under conditions of low personal liability
(Harhoff et al. 1998). Hence, when entrepreneurs are not
liable to their losses under the income tax scheme, they
may be more likely to engage in innovation.
Despite the differences between income and corpo-
rate tax, two of the three arguments concerning the
negative effect of corporate taxes on innovative entre-
preneurship also apply to income taxes. Like with cor-
porate taxes, higher income taxes also reduce the ex-
pected returns from entrepreneurship and subsequently
the prize and motivation for innovation. Prior research
shows that also among entrepreneurs with unincorpo-
rated firms, there are a number of entrepreneurs with
truly innovative business ideas: De Vries and Koster
(2013) and van Stel and de Vries (2015) show that solo
self-employed are, by and large, as innovative as small
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Next to this
demotivation effect, high income taxes also reduce the
amount of funds available for investments in innovation.
With unincorporated businesses, most of those funds
come from prior savings of the entrepreneur, which
are, however, less likely to be build up in case of high
income taxes.
Hence, we put forward the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Income taxes have a negative relation-
ship with innovative entrepreneurship.
3 Data and method
3.1 Data sources
We use both individual- and country-level data. Our
individual-level data are from entrepreneurs who have
participated in the Adult Population Survey (APS) of the
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). The data
covers 53 countries from 2004 to 2011. GEM is the
largest cross-country study of entrepreneurial activity,
aspirations, and attitudes (Reynolds et al. 2005). It col-
lects data on individuals about different aspects of their
entrepreneurial activity, such as the innovativeness of
their ventures, as well as their personal start-up motiva-
tions, entrepreneurial ambitions, and human capital
characteristics, which make the GEM data suitable for
use in our research.
At the country level, we use the World Bank Doing
Business (WBDB) database and the World Competi-
tiveness Yearbook (WCY) for information on start-up
costs and tax rates. The WBDB database contains sev-
eral measures of business regulations and their enforce-
ment for 155 countries from 2004 to the present. These
measures demonstrate the regulatory expenses and pro-
cedures of undertaking business and have been used in
prior research to analyze regulatory influences on the
productivity and growth of entrepreneurs (e.g., Dreher
and Gassebner 2013; Braunerhjelm and Eklund 2014).
We use the WCY for information about corporate and
personal income tax rates, as well as for some control
variables (e.g., GDP growth, GDP per capita). WCY
includes annual data for 18 years for more than 50
countries that participate in the executive survey con-
ducted by the IMDWorld Competitiveness Center. Sev-
eral previous studies have usedWCYmeasures to study
the impact of country-level factors on entrepreneurship
(e.g., van Stel et al. 2007; Hessels et al. 2008).
3.2 Sample
The total GEM sample for 2004 to 2011 is composed of
689,399 individuals aged 18 to 64, including (early-
stage and established) entrepreneurs, employees, unem-
ployed individuals, students, and retirees. Of these,
57,796 persons are early-stage entrepreneurs (8.4%)
(i.e., individuals who are setting up businesses), as well
as entrepreneurs who have started their own business in
the last 42 months. For the purpose of this study, we
focus on whether such early-stage entrepreneurs (that
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we henceforth call Bentrepreneurs^) are innovative (see
also the description of variables as follows).
Table A.1 in the electronic supplementary material
shows the number of individuals and entrepreneurs per
country and distinguishes between innovative and non-
innovative entrepreneurs.
3.3 Variables (individual-level regressions)
Our dependent variable is innovative entrepreneur. This
variable is measured at the individual level, based on a
question in the GEM survey asking entrepreneurs
whether they provide a new product or service to the
market. The variable is a dummy variable that takes the
value one when the product or service offered is per-
ceived by the entrepreneur to be new to customers and
takes the value zero otherwise.
Our main independent variables are start-up costs
and corporate and income tax, which are measured at
the country level. Start-up costs reflect the expenses
required by law to register a new venture in a country.
Tax refers to the (logarithm of) corporate and personal
income tax rates in a country. Table 1 provides a more
detailed overview and description of our independent
variables. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the electronic supple-
mentary material provide more insights into the values
of the dependent and independent variables per country
and per year, respectively.1
One might ask why the share of innovative entrepre-
neurship is 41.8% in Chile or 33.9% in Jordan while it
is, for example, 11.6% in the UK. The explanation is
that advancement of an economy does not necessarily
mean that its entrepreneurs are innovative. Entrepre-
neurs can still be mainly imitative or adopters in an
advanced economy so that the ratio of innovative
entrepreneurs would be low. In developing countries,
there is more room to innovate in the market as many
ideas are not yet tested and can be learned/copied
from more developed countries. Hence, ideas in de-
veloping countries might not be globally innovative,
but they are at least new in their local market.
In addition, we add to the regression model a number
of individual and country-level control variables that are
common determinants of innovative entrepreneurship
(Acs and Audretsch 1987; Koellinger 2008; Anokhin
and Schulze 2009; Autio et al. 2014; Fritsch and
Wyrwich 2018). At the individual level, the following
variables are included: formal education (a dummy var-
iable that indicates whether entrepreneurs have a uni-
versity education), entrepreneurial networks (a dummy
variable indicating whether the entrepreneur knows
someone personally who started a new business in the
last 2 years), perception of entrepreneurial skills (a
dummy variable indicating whether the entrepreneur
perceives him- or herself to have relevant skills, knowl-
edge, and experience for setting up a business), recent
prior entrepreneurship experience (a dummy variable
that indicates whether someone has quit as an entrepre-
neur in the past 12 months), established business own-
ership (a dummy variable that equals one if the respon-
dent owns a business older than 42 months), and gender
(a dummy variable that equals one for males). Age and
age squared are also included. We further added Byear^
and Bindustry^ as dummy variables to the regression
model. The following industries are distinguished: busi-
ness services (financial intermediation, real estate,
renting, and business activities), consumer-oriented ser-
vices (hotels and restaurants, other services), extractive
industries (agriculture, fishing, mining, and quarrying),
and transforming (manufacturing, electricity, gas, water,
construction, trade, repairs, transportation, storage, and
communication). At the country level, we include GDP
growth and the (logarithm of) GDP per capita, which are
both taken from the WCY database. After removing
observations with missing values, we retained a sample
of 632,116 individuals including 43,223 entrepreneurs.
3.4 Regression methods
We analyze our data at both individual and country
levels. At the individual level, we run Heckman probit
regressions; at the country level, we employ fixed effect
panel regressions and (Bayesian) first-difference
regressions.
3.4.1 Individual-level cross-sectional regression:
Heckman probit model
Our dependent variable innovative entrepreneur is binary,
and we use various probit regressions. We cluster the
individual-level data by countries to avoid underestimating
standard errors (Huber and Stanig 2011). Furthermore,
we employ a Heckman probit model to reduce a poten-
tial selection bias when assessing the influence of start-1 These tables show the differences within countries.
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up costs and taxes on the likelihood for entrepreneurs to
be innovative. This is mainly because start-up costs and
taxes could affect the entry of individuals into entrepre-
neurship (Gentry and Hubbard 2000; Djankov et al.
2002; Wen and Gordon 2014), in addition to their effect
on innovative entrepreneurship. As such, trying to esti-
mate the influence of start-up costs and taxes on an
entrepreneur’s likelihood to innovate may lead to biased
estimators when such potential selection bias is not
taken into account. Heckman correction (probit) models
are used to address this methodological issue. Addition-
ally, we test for the presence of a selection bias through
likelihood ratio tests: The likelihood ratio test of rho
(which compares the log likelihoods of the selection
plus outcome models with the log likelihood of the
probit model with sample selection) confirms that a
Heckman model is indeed necessary (Table 2).
The Heckman model has one selection and one out-
come equation. The selection equation (the first stage)
estimates entry into entrepreneurship, including all the
abovementioned individual- and country-level predictors.
We also add the individuals’ employment status (dummy
variables indicating whether someone is employed, un-
employed, a student, or a retiree) to the selection equa-
tion. The outcome equation (i.e., the second stage) esti-
mates whether or not an entrepreneur is innovative. The
Heckman probit model is similar to other Heckman cor-
rection models (Heckman 1976, 1979; Puhani 2000) in
how it corrects for selection bias, except that the
outcome-dependent variable is a dummy variable and
not a metric variable. The main control variables corre-
spond to Braunerhjelm and Eklund (2014).
3.4.2 Country-level longitudinal regressions
Next to the individual level, we analyze our data in an
aggregated form at the country level and thereby employ
a longitudinal perspective. To understand the effect of our
predictors on the outcome variable within each country,
we estimate panel data regressions using data from 2004
to 2011. The dependent variable is the share of innovative
entrepreneurship in a particular country in a particular
year. The variable is calculated from the individual-level
variable innovative entrepreneur and measures the aggre-
gate number of innovative entrepreneurs as a percentage
of all entrepreneurs per country. We included country-
level main and control variables in line with
Braunerhjelm and Eklund (2014). Such panel data inves-
tigations are only possible at the country and not at the
individual level, because the individual-level GEM
dataset is not a panel dataset; every year, it uses a different
or new sample of individuals (Reynolds et al. 2005).
We analyze our country-level dataset through both a
fixed effect panel data regression and a first-difference
regression. The first-difference regression is estimated in
a Bayesian way. The main reason is that first differencing
reduces the number of observations per country substan-
tially making classical null hypothesis significance testing
difficult. Bayesian analysis, in turn, exploits fully the in-
formation provided in small samples. It is able to investi-
gate the relationships between variables using small sam-
ples; sample size does not influence its ability to test
whether a particular relationship is Btrue^ or not (see Block
et al. (2014), for a deeper discussion of Bayesian analysis).
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Before we describe our main results, we present descrip-
tive statistics and correlations for the variables used in
our study (Table A.3 in the electronic supplementary
material). Eighteen percent of the entrepreneurs are
innovative and introduce new products or services to
themarket. Forty-nine percent of the entrepreneurs have a
university education, 3% have recent prior entrepreneur-
ship experience, and 37% have another entrepreneur in
Table 1 Data sources for the main country-level variables
Variable Description Source
Start-up costs The average costs of obtaining legal status to operate a firm, measured as
a percentage of per capita income. It contains all recognizable official
expenses such as fees, costs of forms and procedures, photocopies, fiscal
stamps, and legal and notary charges
WBDB
Corporate tax rate Maximum corporate tax rate, calculated on profit before tax WCY
Income tax rate Maximum personal income tax rate as a percent of the individual’s income WCY
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their networks. Regarding country-level indicators, it
takes on average 9% of a person’s income (measured as
GDP per capita) to register a company. Mean corporate
and personal income tax rates are 27 and 32%,
respectively.
The correlation matrix shows that the correlations
between individual-level variables are low. Regarding
macro level variables, we find high correlations between
log GDP per capita and start-up costs (correlation is −
0.65), as well as between corporate and personal income
tax rates (correlation is 0.48). In light of these high
correlations, we adopt a stepwise approach in our re-
gression analysis.
4.2 Individual-level cross-sectional regressions:
Heckman probit model
4.2.1 Main findings
Table 2 presents the Heckman probit regression results.
We find a significant positive relationship between the
start-up costs and the entrepreneurs’ likelihood to inno-
vate (model I in Table 2). We find a marginal effect of
0.1% point. That is, evaluated at sample means, a 10%-
point increase in start-up costs from the mean leads to an
increase in the predicted probability of innovative entre-
preneurship of 1% point—an increase of 9.8%.
Our results (model II and model III in Table 2) further
show an overall significant negative relationship be-
tween the corporate and personal tax rates and the
entrepreneurs’ likelihood to innovate. We find a mar-
ginal effect of − 1% point for the variable corporate tax
rate (log). That is, evaluated at the sample mean, a 10%-
point decrease in a country’s corporate tax rates from the
mean leads to an increase in the predicted probability of
innovative entrepreneurship of 0.6% points—an in-
crease of approximately 6%. Moreover, we find a sig-
nificant marginal effect of − 1.7% points for the variable
personal income tax rate (log). When all independent
variables (i.e., start-up costs and taxes) are included
simultaneously (model IV in Table 2), we see that the
results for start-up costs and corporate taxes remain
significant, but the income tax rate variable becomes
insignificant.
4.2.2 Findings regarding control variables
At the country level, GDP growth and log GDP per
capita have insignificant associations with the
entrepreneurs’ likelihood to innovate. At the individual
level, a high level of formal education, knowing another
entrepreneur, prior entrepreneurship experience, and
(perceived) entrepreneurial skills have significant positive
associations with the entrepreneurs’ propensity to inno-
vate. Among these variables, the perception of entrepre-
neurial skills seems to have the strongest relationshipwith
innovation (a marginal effect of 5.4% points).
The selection model indicates that start-up costs and tax
rates are not significantly related to entrepreneurial entry of
individuals. At the country level, only log GDP per capita
consistently shows a significant negative relationship with
entry into entrepreneurship. At the individual level, prior
entrepreneurship experience, perception of entrepreneurial
skills, having entrepreneurial networks and being male
show significant positive relationships with the individ-
uals’ likelihood to become an entrepreneur. Being an
established business owner and being of advanced age
relate negatively to entry into entrepreneurship.
4.3 Country-level longitudinal regressions
4.3.1 Fixed effect panel data regression
Our fixed effect panel data regression results are
presented in Table 3. As this analysis is conducted
at the country level, we use Bshare of innovative
en t repreneu rsh ip^ r a the r than Binnova t ive
entrepreneur^ as outcome variable. We find that
only corporate tax rate has a statistically significant
Table 3 Fixed effect panel regressions at the country level (de-
pendent variable: share of innovative entrepreneurship)
Country-level variable Coefficient (standard error)
Start-up costs 0.001 (0.001)
Corporate tax rate (log) − 0.060* (0.030)
Income tax rate (log) 0.017 (0.023)
GDP per capita (log) 0.040 (0.035)
GDP growth rate − 0.001 (0.001)
Country clustered standard errors Yes
Constant − 0.099 (0.355)
Number of countries 53
Number of observations 276
R2 0.06
* denotes significance at 10%;** denotes significance at 5%; ***
denotes significance at 1%
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(negative) relationship with the share of innovative
entrepreneurship. Start-up costs and income tax rate
do not have statistically significant relationships
with the share of innovative entrepreneurship.
4.3.2 Bayesian first-difference regression
In order to take out any spurious correlation that might
be due to the non-stationarity of our time series data, we
calculated the first differences (period-to-period change)
of our regression variables and ran a simple pooled OLS
model at the country level. The variables are the same as
those in the fixed effect model (Table 3). Using first
differences has led to a loss of 28% of our data points.
For this reason, we ran the first-difference regression in
a Bayesian way. The results are as follows: the mean
coefficient of corporate tax rate is − 0.055, and the
probability of a positive effect is 17.44%; the mean
coefficient of income tax rate is 0.033, and the proba-
bility of a positive effect is 76.26%; the mean coefficient
of start-up costs is − 0.001, and the probability of a
positive effect is 13.60%.2
Table 4 summarizes our main results. Corporate taxes
show a negative relationship with innovative entrepre-
neurship in all three types of regressions. This is not true
for income taxes, which seem to have little relationships
with innovative entrepreneurship. High start-up costs
show a positive relationship with innovative entrepre-
neurship in cross-sectional regressions but not in longi-
tudinal regressions.
4.4 Robustness checks and further analyses
4.4.1 Inclusion of other control variables
in individual-level regressions
To further check the robustness of our results, we in-
cluded a number of country-level control variables used
in prior research. Due to having a sample of only 53
countries, we added these control variables once at a
time and replace one of the current control variables.
Table A.5 in the electronic supplementary material sum-
marizes the results of these robustness tests. As can be
seen, in most cases, the results are robust.
Among others, we looked into the role of country-level
insolvency costs. To do so, we added the insolvency costs
(as a percentage of estate) from World Bank Doing Busi-
ness data to the as a further country-level control variable
to the individual-level Heckman regressions. The original
resultswere robust suggesting that corporate tax rate shows
a negative significant relationship and start-up costs show a
positive significant relationship with innovative entrepre-
neurship (Table A.5 in the electronic supplementary
material). Insolvency costs show no significant relation-
ship with innovative entrepreneurship. We further find that
corporate tax rate and insolvency costs have low correla-
tions and that no interaction effects exist.
Lastly and looking into the level of formal versus
informal entrepreneurial activities in a country, we find
that when we add high formal rate of entrepreneurship
as a control variable, the results are partially robust.
Corporate tax rate still shows a significant negative
relationship with innovative entrepreneurship. More-
over, we interacted the formal rate of entrepreneurship
with start-up costs and with corporate tax rate. We find
that there is no difference between countries with high
rates versus countries with low rates of formal2 Results of this analysis are available from the corresponding author.
Table 4 Summary of main findings
Within countries (longitudinal investigation) Between countries (cross-sectional investigation)
Regression type Fixed effect panel regression Bayesian first-difference
regression
Heckman probit regression
Variable
Start-up costs Insignificant coeff. Negative coefficient Positive and significant coeff.
Corporate tax rate Negative and significant coeff. Negative coefficient Negative and significant coeff.
Income tax rate Insignificant coeff. Positive coefficient Insignificant coeff.
Coeff. coefficient
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entrepreneurship regarding the effects of start-up costs
on innovative entrepreneurship. However, the formal
entrepreneurship interaction term with corporate tax rate
suggests that in countries with high formal entrepreneur-
ship rates, the effects of corporate tax rate on innovative
entrepreneurship are more pronounced.
4.4.2 Multilevel regressions
The likelihood ratio test results that are provided in
Table 2 show that a Heckman model is necessary due
to the existence of a selection bias. Still, we ran multi-
level regressions as a further robustness check. Such
multilevel regressions are specifically designed to inves-
tigate hierarchical level data taking into account possible
intraclass correlations. The multilevel logit regressions
show similar results as the Heckman probit regressions
(Table A.6 in the electronic supplementary material).
Using these models, we also find that start-up costs have
a significant positive relationship to the entrepreneurs’
probability for being innovative and that corporate and
income tax rates have a significant negative association
with the likelihood of innovative entrepreneurship.
5 Discussion and conclusions
5.1 Summary and interpretation of main results
Our results support the conclusion that start-up costs and
tax rates can have strong relationships with innovative
entrepreneurship. Our cross-country analysis shows that
start-up costs have a significant positive relationship
with the entrepreneurs’ propensity to innovate. At first
sight, this seems against the findings of prior studies,
which found a negative relationship between start-up
regulations and entrepreneurial entry (De Soto 1989;
Djankov et al. 2002; Klapper et al. 2006). We interpret
our finding as evidence for the need to distinguish
between different types of entrepreneurship when inves-
tigating the effects of deregulation on entrepreneurship.
While reducing start-up costs may lower the barriers to
entry and increase the quantity of entrepreneurship, it
may not necessarily have a positive effect on the quality
of entrepreneurship. In fact, as our results show, coun-
tries with high levels of start-up costs seem to have a
higher share of innovative entrepreneurship.
Our finding that start-up costs hamper innovative
entrepreneurship is only confirmed in our cross-
sectional and not in our longitudinal investigations.
However, when a country changes its start-up costs, this
will not immediately have an effect on the share of
innovative entrepreneurs in that country. One potential
explanation for this is that start-up costs often do not
come alone but are correlated with other entry regula-
tions (e.g., time required to start a business) (van Stel
et al. 2007; Branstetter et al. 2014). While the level of
start-up costs has gone down noticeably between 2004
and 2011, the time needed to start a new business is still
considerably high (around 43 days for upper middle
income countries in 2011).3 Furthermore, and in line
with Estrin et al. (2013), it could be that the time period
(from 2004 to 2011) is too short to see longitudinal
effects of changes in institutions such as start-up costs.
While we often see changes in the start-up costs in this
period (Table A.2 in the electronic supplementary
material), organizations behind start-up regulations such
as the chamber of commerce usually take much more
time to change (Van de Vliert et al. 2016). Such organi-
zations may reduce start-up costs in a short period, but
other regulations (e.g., administrative procedures) as
well as informal institutions around start-up costs (e.g.,
norms and culture) change with a much slower pace
(Fritsch and Wyrwich 2018).
We find that corporate taxes have a negative relation-
ship with innovative entrepreneurship while there seems
to be little effect of income taxes. How can we explain
these differing effects? As noted previously, one impor-
tant difference between corporate and personal income
tax is that the personal income tax scheme typically
allows deducting losses from other income while this
is not possible for corporate losses (Cullen and Gordon
2007). Thus, while both types of tax take away part of
the entrepreneurial income, unincorporated firms are
insured through personal income tax schemes while
incorporated firms do not have such an insurance.
Hence, the deterring effect of high taxes for innovative
entrepreneurship is higher for corporate versus income
taxes.
Moreover, high corporate tax rates can be considered
for incorporated firms as decreasing their financial re-
sources available for investments in innovation. Tech-
nology start-ups, which are often incorporated firms,
often depend on their own financial resources for devel-
oping new products and ideas in early stages. The
3 See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.REG.DURS?locations=
XT (accessed September 2017).
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situation is different for many unincorporated firms. The
entrepreneurs behind these firms, which are often sole
proprietors, freelancers, or part-time entrepreneurs do
not have such a strong growth agenda and thus do not
invest so heavily in innovation. A cut in income tax does
not change their agenda or goals and will not have a
profound effect on their investments in innovation. Re-
ductions in income taxes should thus not increase the
share of innovative entrepreneurship in a country.
Finally, incorporated firms typically rely more on ex-
ternal financing such as venture capital compared with
unincorporated firms. In fact, the reason why they are
incorporated might be that they want to attract venture
capital or other forms of external financing. High corpo-
rate tax rates reduce the expected returns on innovative
ventures and subsequently decrease venture capital in-
vestments in innovative start-ups (Djankov et al. 2010).
Prior research shows that the inflow of venture capital
investments is linked to start-up and industry innovation
(Kortum and Lerner 2000). A similar argument can be
made with regard to the inflow of foreign direct invest-
ment. Heavy taxation is shown to have an adverse influ-
ence on the inflow of foreign direct investment (Djankov
et al. 2010). Foreign investors normally bring their
knowledge, experience, and technologies, along with
their money, to the countries in which they invest (De
Clercq et al. 2008), spurring start-up innovation.
5.2 Policy implications
To date, little scholarly attention has been devoted to the
influence of the costs imposed by regulations on innova-
tive entrepreneurship. Regulations are typically not con-
sidered as a source of costs that take away the prize of
entrepreneurial innovation. Although studies investigated
the influence of institutions and regulations on the level
and the type of entrepreneurship (Cullen and Gordon
2007; Branstetter et al. 2014), it is unclear, particularly at
the micro-level, how innovative entrepreneurship is affect-
ed. Our article sheds light on this issue. Ourmain argument
is premised on the notion that entrepreneurs innovate
mainly to gain above-average profit margins, in line with
Schumpeter’s proposition (1934). In this context, the gov-
ernment can stimulate entrepreneurial innovation by using
appropriate business regulations to structure the relative
rewards for innovation (Baumol 1990).
Some policy implications can be derived from our
findings. Firstly, there seems to be an important difference
between one-off costs (start-up costs) and recurring costs
(taxes) imposed by regulations on entrepreneurial behavior.
Entrepreneurs seem to perceive start-up costs as one-off
entry costs, and if they believe in the promise of their ideas
and in future returns on their venture, they are willing to
incur such costs to start their business. Entrepreneurs,
however, view corporate taxes as recurring costs that come
back every period and take away part of their income.
Every period that entrepreneurs calculate their revenue
and expenses, they see such tax payments as costs that
reduce their net profit and take away the money they need
to further developing their ideas. Secondly, our cross-
sectional investigations show that start-up costs have a
significant positive relationship with the entrepreneur’s
likelihood to be innovative. This finding suggests that
policy-makers should carefully consider the consequences
of lowering start-up costs. The quality of entrepreneurship
might in fact go down as a result. The reason is that it
becomes easier for entrepreneurs with not so promising
ideas to enter the market. Lowering start-up costs may
reduce the entry barriers to start a business but our findings
suggest that it is not effective as a tool to motivate individ-
uals with innovative ideas to become entrepreneurs. Third-
ly, the government can stimulate innovative entrepreneur-
ship by tying costs less directly to the rewards of innova-
tion. For example, and in line with Baumol et al. (2007),
tax on properties and goods is preferred to tax on profit if
the goal is to promote innovative business activities and
growth. The results of our paper are in accordancewith this
argument. We find that when countries reduce the level of
corporate taxes, innovative entrepreneurship is stimulated.
Yet, this effect was not found for personal income taxes.
We conclude that changes in corporate tax levels are a
more effective tool than changes in personal income taxes
to promote innovative entrepreneurship. There has been a
lot of discussion and competition between countries on
reducing the corporate tax rate (Djankov 2017). The most
recent discussion is in the USA, where the corporate tax
rate is relatively high and has not been changed for the past
30 years. Our results suggest that a cut in corporate tax rates
may indeed favor innovative entrepreneurship, which is an
important source of economic growth (Schumpeter 1934;
Block et al. 2017). This result of our study is in line with
two recent papers calculating the impacts of the proposed
tax reform of the US government. Bhattarai et al. (2017)
and Haughton et al. (2017) simulate the impacts of the
proposed cut in the corporate income tax rate and find that
corporate investments and capital formation will increase.
In particular, innovative industries such as machinery and
instruments as well as the computer sector will benefit. The
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results of the two studies, however, also show that this
proposed tax reform comes with two important negative
side effects: first, the income gap between rich and poor
households in the USAwill rise (even further), and second,
there will be a huge budget deficit of the US government.
5.3 Limitations and further research
This study has a number of limitations that need to be
taken into account. Using an objective measure of inno-
vation (e.g., new product sales as a percentage of total
sales) would be preferred to the self-reported measure
used in this study. However, access to such data in a
cross-country setting that includes enough observations
for each country would be difficult, if not impossible to
obtain. Another limitation concerns the relatively low
within-country variation of our independent variables
(Table A.2), which reduces the power of our longitudinal
investigations. It would be great to use a larger time span
with hopefully more within country variation for our
fixed effect regressions. Finally, we should note that our
research design cannot completely rule out endogeneity
concerns. It is conceivable that our (most robust) finding
regarding the relationship between corporate tax rate and
innovative entrepreneurship is in fact driven by an omit-
ted variable that is correlated with both corporate taxes
and innovative entrepreneurship. As we have carefully
tried to rule out such a concern in our cross-sectional
individual-level regressions (see Table A.5), we do not
have such a possibility in our longitudinal regressions.
For this, we would need a valid and statistically strong
instrumental variable and/or an individual-level panel
dataset spanning over several decades and countries.
The paper by Hansson (2012) is a nice example of a
study with such a robust and preferable research design.
The study investigates the relationship between income
taxes and the decision to become self-employed using a
large, representative household level panel dataset from
Sweden spanning in total 16 years of data.
Wewould like to highlight fourmain avenues for future
studies. First, one could investigate how such one-off
versus recurring costs resulting from regulations and taxes
influence the innovativeness of important sub-groups of
entrepreneurs such as female entrepreneurs (Dilli and
Westerhuis 2018), part-time entrepreneurs (Block and
Landgraf 2016; Schulz et al. 2016), and solo self-
employed (van Stel and de Vries 2015). Entrepreneurs
are a very heterogeneous group, and it is valuable to study
important sub-groups. Second, it would be interesting to
investigate the impact of other regulations, such as labor
regulations on the entrepreneurs’ propensity to innovate,
and how they moderate the effects of start-up costs and
taxes. High costs imposed by labor regulations, for exam-
ple, may increase the costs of innovation because innova-
tion is often accompanied with labor adjustments
(Scarpetta and Tressel 2004), though such costs may also
discourage the entry of entrepreneurs with not so promis-
ing ideas. Third, we look in our study at only one type of
innovation, namely product innovation. Further research
could investigate the relationship between tax rates and
other types of innovation. High tax rates, for example, may
stimulate entrepreneurs to buy new machinery and declare
it as a cost to avoid high tax payments, hence increasing
the likelihood of process innovation. Fourth, it would be
interesting to look at the effects of start-up costs and taxes
on other innovation entrepreneurship-related outcome var-
iables. While our study investigates how start-up costs and
taxes are related to the rate of innovative entrepreneurship,
we do not investigate how successful and sustainable these
newly created innovative ventures in fact are. It might be
that a drastic cut in corporate taxes not only has the already
widely discussed negative side effects on societal inequal-
ity and governmental budget deficit (Bhattarai et al. 2017;
Haughton et al. 2017) but also pushes individuals into
innovative entrepreneurship that would actually be Bbetter
off^ working as a paid employee in an established firm.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestrict-
ed use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if
changes were made.
References
Acs, Z., & Audretsch, D. (1987). Innovation, market structure and
firm size. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(4),
567–574. https://doi.org/10.2307/1935950.
Anokhin, S., & Schulze, W. S. (2009). Entrepreneurship, innova-
tion, and corruption. Journal of Business Venturing, 24(5),
465–476. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2008.06.001.
Autio, E., Kenney, M., Mustar, P., Siegel, D., & Wright, M.
(2014). Entrepreneurial innovation: the importance of con-
text. Research Policy, 43(7), 1097–1108. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.01.015.
Balliamoune-Lutz, M., & Garello, P. (2014). Tax structure and
entrepreneurship. Small Business Economics, 42(1), 165–
190. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-013-9469-9.
Taxes, start-up costs, and innovative entrepreneurship 367
Baumol, W. J. (1990). Entrepreneurship: productive, unproduc-
tive, and destructive. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5),
893–919. https://doi.org/10.1016/0883-9026(94)00014-x.
Baumol, W. J., Litan, R. E., & Schramm, C. J. (2007). Good
capitalism, bad capitalism and the economics of growth
and prosperity. New Haven: Yale University Press.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.985843.
Bhattarai, K., Haughton, J., Head, M., & Tuerck, D. G. (2017).
Simulating corporate income tax reform proposals with a
dynamic CGE model. International Journal of Economics
and Finance, 9(5), 20–35.
Blackburn, R. A., & Schaper, M. T. (2016). Government, SMEs
and entrepreneurship development. London: Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315585666.
Block, J. (2016). Corporate income taxes and entrepreneurship
activity. IZA World of Labor. https://doi.org/10.15185
/izawol.257.
Block, J., & Landgraf, A. (2016). Transition from part-time entre-
preneurship to full-time entrepreneurship: the role of finan-
c ia l and non- f inanc ia l mot ives . In terna t ional
Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 12(1), 259–
282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11365-014-0331-6.
Block, J., Miller, D., & Wagner, D. (2014). Bayesian methods in
family business research. Journal of Family Business
Strategy, 5(1), 97–104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jfbs.2013.12.003.
Block, J., Fisch, C., & van Praag, M. (2017). The Schumpeterian
entrepreneur: a review of the empirical evidence on the
antecedents, behavior, and consequences on innovative en-
trepreneurship. Industry and Innovation, 24(1), 61–95.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13662716.2016.1216397.
Branstetter, L., Lima, F., Taylor, L. J., & Venâncio, A. (2014). Do
entry regulations deter entrepreneurship and job creation?
Evidence from recent reforms in Portugal. The Economic
Journal, 124(577), 805–832. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12044.
Braunerhjelm, P., & Eklund, J. E. (2014). Taxes, tax administrative
burdens and new firm formation. Kyklos, 67(1), 1–11.
https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12040.
Bruce, D., &Mohsin,M. (2006). Tax policy and entrepreneurship:
new time series evidence. Small Business Economics, 26(5),
409–425. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-005-5602-8.
Bruhn, M. (2011). License to sell: the effect of business registra-
tion reform on entrepreneurial activity in Mexico. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(1), 382–386.
https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4538.
Chatterji, A., Glaeser, E., & Kerr, W. (2014). Clusters of entrepre-
neurship and innovation. Innovation Policy and the
Economy, 14(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1086/674023.
Clingingsmith, D., & Shane, S. (2016). How individual income
tax policy affects entrepreneurship. Fordham Law Review,
84, 2495–2516.
Cullen, J. B., & Gordon, R. H. (2007). Taxes and entrepreneurial
risk-taking: theory and evidence for the U.S. Journal of
Public Economics, 91(7–8), 1479–1505. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.12.001.
Davidsson, P., & Honig, B. (2003). The role of social and human
capital among nascent entrepreneurs. Journal of Business
Venturing, 18(3), 301–331. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0883-
9026(02)00097-6.
De Clercq, D., Hessels, J., & Van Stel, A. J. (2008). Knowledge
spillovers and new ventures’ export orientation. Small
Business Economics, 31(3), 283–303. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11187-008-9132-z.
De Meza, D., &Webb, D. C. (1999). Wealth, enterprise and credit
policy. The Economic Journal, 109(455), 153–163.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00424.
De Soto, H. (1989). The other path: the invisible revolution in the
third world. New York: Harper and Row. https://doi.
org/10.2307/20043955.
DeVries, N., & Koster, S. (2013). Determinants of innovative solo
self-employment: a regional approach, In: EIASM, ECSB and
ISM: RENTXXVII conference (Research in Entrepreneurship
and Small Business), Book of abstracts, Vilnius: ISM, p. 54.
Desai, M., Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. (2003). Institutions, capital
constraints and entrepreneurial firm dynamics: evidence from
Europe. NBER Working Paper No. 10165. https://doi.
org/10.3386/w10165.
Dilli, S., & Westerhuis, G. (2018). Institutions, gender differences
in human capital, and entrepreneurship. Small Business
Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-018-0004-x.
Djankov, S. (2017). Corporate tax cuts: examining the record in
other countries. Peterson Institute for International
Economics, Paper no. PB17–14.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A.
(2002). The regulation of entry. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 117(1), 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1162
/003355302753399436.
Djankov, S., Ganser, T., McLiesh, C., Ramalho, R., & Shleifer, A.
(2010). The effect of corporate taxes on investment and
entrepreneurship. American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 2, 31–64. https://doi.org/10.1257
/mac.2.3.31.
Dreher, A., & Gassebner, M. (2013). Greasing the wheels? The
impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry. Public
Choice, 155(3), 413–432. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-
011-9871-2.
Estrin, S., Korosteleva, J., & Mickiewicz, T. (2013). Which insti-
tutions encourage entrepreneurial growth aspirations?
Journal of Business Venturing, 28(4), 564–580. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2012.05.001.
Fölster, S. (2002). Do lower taxes stimulate self-employment?
Small Business Economics, 19(2), 135–145. https://doi.
org/10.1023/a:1016200800982.
Fritsch, M., &Wyrwich, M. (2018). Regional knowledge, entre-
preneurial culture and innovative start-ups over time and
space—an empirical investigation. Small Business
Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-018-0016-6.
Gentry, W., & Hubbard, G. (2000). Tax policy and entrepreneurial
entry. The American Economic Review, 90(2), 283–287.
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.283.
Gregg, D., & Parthasarathy, M. (2017). Factors affecting the long-
term survival of eBay ventures: a longitudinal study. Small
Business Economics, 49, 405–419. https://doi.org/10.1007
/s11187-017-9846-x.
Haans, R., & van Witteloostuijn, A. (2016). Expected job creation
across the cultural industries: a sectoral division and its
implications for cultural policy. International Journal of
Cultural Policy, 24, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080
/10286632.2015.1128420.
Hallen, B., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (2012). Catalyzing strategies and
efficient tie formation: how entrepreneurial firms obtain
368 P. Darnihamedani et al.
investment ties. Academy of Management Journal, 55(1),
35–70. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.0620.
Hansson, A. (2012). Tax policy and entrepreneurship: empirical
evidence from Sweden. Small Business Economics, 38(4),
495–513. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-010-9282-7.
Harhoff, D., Stahl, K., & Woywode, M. (1998). Legal form,
growth and exit of West German firms—empirical results
for manufacturing, construction, trade and service industries.
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 46(4), 453–488.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00083.
Haughton, J., Backman, K., Bhattarai, D., Tuerck, G. (2017).
Distribution effects of the Trump and Clinton tax proposals.
Atlantic Economic Journal, 1–20.
Heckman, J. (1976). The common structure of statistical models of
truncation, sample selection, and limited dependent variables,
and a simple estimator for such models. Annals of Economic
and Social Measurement, 5, 475-492.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specification
Error. Econometrica, 47(l), 53-161.
Henrekson, M., & Sanandaji, T. (2011). Entrepreneurship and the
theory of taxation. Small Business Economics, 37(2), 167–
185. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-009-9242-2.
Hessels, J., van Gelderen, M., & Thurik, R. (2008).
Entrepreneurial aspirations, motivations, and their drivers.
Small Business Economics, 31(3), 323–339. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11187-008-9134-x.
Ho, Y., & Wong, P. (2007). Financing, regulatory costs and entre-
preneurial prosperity. Small Business Economics, 28(2),
187–204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-006-9015-0.
Huber, J. D., & Stanig, P. (2011). Church-state separation and
redistribution. Journal of Public Economics, 95(7–8), 828–
836. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.02.001.
Kamleitner, B., Korunka, C., & Kirchner, E. (2012). Tax compli-
ance of small business owners: a review. International
Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior and Research, 18(3),
330–351. https://doi.org/10.1108/13552551211227710.
Kaplan, D. S., Piedra, E., & Seira, E. (2011). Entry regulation and
business start-ups: evidence from Mexico. Journal of Public
Economics, 95(11–12), 1501–1515. https://doi.org/10.1016
/j.jpubeco.2011.03.007.
Klapper, L., Laeven, L., & Rajan, R. (2006). Entry regulation as a
barrier to entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial Economics,
8 2 ( 3 ) , 5 9 1 – 6 2 9 . h t t p s : / / d o i . o r g / 1 0 . 1 0 1 6 / j .
jfineco.2005.09.006.
Koellinger, P. (2008). Why are some entrepreneurs more innova-
tive than others? Small Business Economics, 31(1), 21–37.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-008-9107-0.
Kortum, S., & Lerner, J. (2000). Assessing the contribution of
venture capital to innovation. RAND Journal of Economics,
31, 674–669.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
(1999). The quality of government. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, 15(1), 222–279. https://doi.
org/10.3386/w6727.
Lee, Y., & Gordon, R. H. (2005). Tax structure and economic
growth. Journal of Public Economics, 89(5–6), 1027–1043.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.07.002.
Monteiro, J. C. M., & Assunção, J. J. (2012). Coming out of the
shadows? Estimating the impact of bureaucracy simplifica-
tion and tax cut on formality in Brazilian microenterprises.
Journal of Development Economics, 99(1), 105–115.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.10.002.
Puhani, P. (2000). The Heckman correction for sample selection
and its critique. Journal of Economic Surveys,14(1), 53-68.
Raffiee, J., & Feng, J. (2014). Should I quit my day job? A hybrid
path to entrepreneurship. Academy of Management Journal,
57(4), 936–963. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2012.0522.
Reynolds, P., Bosma, N., Autio, E., Hunt, S., De Bono, N.,
Servais, I., Lopez-Garcia, P., & Chin, N. (2005). Global
entrepreneurship monitor: Data collection design and imple-
mentation 1998-2003. Small Business Economics, 24(3),
205–231. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-005-1980-1.
Rostam-Afschar, D. (2014). Entry regulation and entrepreneur-
ship: a natural experiment in German craftsmanship.
Empirical Economics, 47(3), 1067–1101. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s00181-013-0773-7.
Scarpetta, S., & Tressel, T. (2004). Boosting productivity via
innovation and adoption of new technologies: any role for
labor market institutions? World Bank Working Papers.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.535682.
Scarpetta, S., Hemmings, P., Tressel, T., Woo, J. (2002). The role
of policy and institutions for productivity and firm dynamics:
evidence from micro and industry data. OECD Economics
Department Working Papers, No. 329, OECD Publishing.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.308680.
Schulz, M., Urbig, D., & Procher, V. (2016). Hybrid entrepreneur-
ship and public policy: the case of firm entry deregulation.
Journal of Business Venturing, 31(3), 272–286. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2016.01.002.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The theory of economic development.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. https://doi.
org/10.1007/0-306-48082-4_3.
SRI International. (1999). International practices and experiences
in business startup procedures. Arlington: SRI.
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: strategic and insti-
tutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20(3),
571–610. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1995.9508080331.
Thaler, R. H. (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making, 12(3), 183–206.
Van de Vliert, E., Janssen, O., & Van der Vegt, G. (2016). Hard or
easy? Difficult of entrepreneurial startups in 107 climate-
economic environment. Applied Psychology, 65(3), 469–
489. https://doi.org/10.1111/apps.12057.
Van Stel, A., & de Vries, N. (2015). The economic value of
different types of solo self-employed: a review. In The hand-
book of research on freelancing and self-employment (pp.
77–84). Dublin: Senate Hall Academic Publishing.
Van Stel, A., Storey, D. J., & Thurik, A. R. (2007). The effect of
business regulations on nascent and young business entre-
preneurship. Small Business Economics, 28(2–3), 171–186.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-006-9014-1.
Wen, J. F., & Gordon, D. V. (2014). An empirical model of tax
convexity and self-employment. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 96(3), 471–482. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_
a_00388.
Yakovlev, E., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2013). The unequal enforce-
ment of liberalization: evidence from Russia’s reform of
business regulation. Journal of European Economic
Association, 11(4), 808–838. https://doi.org/10.1111
/jeea.12026.
Taxes, start-up costs, and innovative entrepreneurship 369
